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Notes
TAXATION-INCOIVIE UNDER OKLAHOMA COIIVUNITY PROPERTY
LAw-As the Review goes to press it seems desirable to call at-
tention to the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Har-
mon' even though time and space preclude an extended discus-
sion of this important decision. The facts may be summarized as
follows: In July 1939 the state of Oklahoma adopted a commu-
nity property law which was of a permissive nature. One C. C.
Harmon and his wife filed their written election to come under
its provisions, and in 1939 submitted their separate income tax
returns wherein each reported one-half of the November and
December income received by both as community income under
the act. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the'
husband was taxable on all the income received by him, and was
not liable on any of the income received from his wife's separate
property. The Tax Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed this ruling, and decided that the spouses were right in
filing separate returns for one-half of the joint income, relying
upon the position adopted, by the federal courts in Poe v. Sea-
born.2 The Supreme Court, however, reinstated the holding of
the commissioner under the case of Lucas v. Earl.3 It grounded
its decision on the optional feature of the Oklahoma community
property act, indicating that the "legislative permission" was a
mere variation and added nothing to this "consensual contract"
of the parties in their own regulation of their rights in, income
and hence fell under the bann of the Lucas case. The majority
opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Roberts, recognized a definite
distinction between Oklahoma's permissive system and a legal
system "dictated by state policy as an incident of matrimony."'
The fact was stressed that those states which had long had the
legal community were in an entirely different category.
The very old controversy of "the nature of the wife's inter-
est" in the community was touched upon but lightly as a matter
1. 65 S. Ct. 103 (U. S. 1944).
2. 282 U. S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (1930).
3. 281 U. S. 111, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74 L.Ed. 731 (1930).




settled by the states themselves. It was stated that the California
Act of 19276 was but a legislative declaration of this controversial
question which still left California in an entirely different class
from Oklahoma with the latter's permissive statute, even though
the California Supreme Court and the legislature of California
had previously indicated that the wife had but an expectancy
and not a vested interest in community during the life of that
entity. No mention whatever was made of tax evasion or saving
by legislative process, nor is there any suggestion as to what the
rule might be should Oklahoma or any other state6 or states adopt
community as its legal system, whatever their motive. This de-
cision is most heartening to citizens of community property states
where the legal community has been the "inveterate policy of
the State." The court pointed out that Congress had full knowl-
edge of the tax variations caused by the differences in the settled
policies of the various states, that it had been asked to revise the
revenue act to change the "incidents of the tax" and had refused.
Satisfaction flows from the majority opinion to those who
have long believed in the community property system as a family
binder founded on sound principles of justice and fair dealing
between spouses long before income taxes were a matter of ap-
parently paramount concern. Legislative juggling with the sys-
tem solely for tax reasons has been frowned upon by many
thoughtful persons. While the majority opinion in no wise pur-
ports to act as a brake upon such legislation it may be a deter-
rent because of the stress on "inveterate policies."
This satisfaction is marred somewhat by the vigorous dissent
of Mr. Justice Douglas who already has one concurrer in the
person of Mr. Justice Black. Mr. Justice Douglas seems to be
concerned solely with loss to the United States Treasury, and
with "unjustifiable discrimination against the residents of non-
community property states." His position is that marriage or
change of domicile is also a consensual act and hence that the
distinction made by the majority is one without a difference. He
feels that the vested interest theory of the wife in the husband's
earnings is the distinguishing feature if any of Oklahoma's law
together with that of other community property states. He ap-
parently does not like any part of the community property idea,
particularly the notion of a wife having a property interest in
the husband's earnings. It might be said, in passing, that the
5. Calif. joint resolution 17; Calif. Stats. of 1927, c. 68.
6. Oregon Laws of 1943, c. 440.
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theory may also apply as to the wife's earnings which under
present social and economic conditions are considerable.
Mr. Justice Douglas seems to read the majority opinion as
resting upon the "new born" versus the "traditional" community
property idea of those states who adopted it long before tax con-
troversies arose rather than upon the. "legal" versus the "option-
al" idea of Oklahoma. Mr. Justice Douglas makes it quite clear
that his dissent is not in defense of the vested interest distinction
made in previous cases but in the interest of uniformity. His
thought seems to be not that we should leave to Congress the
task of finding a new incident of taxation but that the court
should look after federal finance by simply overruling Poe v.
Seaborn.7 He uses the phrase "disastrous to federal finance." The
loss in ease to tax leviers and collectors for achievement of uni-
formity and efficiency is a small price to pay for the satisfaction
of the thus far willing tax-paying citizenry by preservation of
bona fide distinctions between theories regarding property in
which the states believe. Certainly the fine minds and demon-
strated ingenuity of our tax leviers can be depended upon to find
a taxable incident which will prevent "disaster" and yet preserve
property distinctions which mean much in keeping the faith and
which are not "elusive and subtle casuistries" to those who hap-
pen to like their particular property systems which, moreover,
they can change themselves if they care to.
Doubtless every citizen in a disgruntled mood has at some
time either orally or in writing put the word law in quotes. Nev-
ertheless, from the pen of a justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States it is disturbing,8 as is the statement that "the for-
mula for some states . .. should be the formula for all."" Every
tax formula is traditionally bitter. If minor variations founded
upon bona fide distinctions are made in deference to the palates
of the several states a cure can be obtained with much greater
cheerfulness from the patient who must swallow the dose. The
old fable of the wolf and the lamb recites that the wolf com-
plained to the lamb that the latter was muddying the water of
the stream from which they both were drinking. The lamb pointed
out that he was below the wolf and hence could not be disturbing
the water running by the wolf. Whereupon, the wolf stated that
7. 282 U. S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (1930).
8. See, for example, the statements in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Harmon, 65 S.Ct. 103, 105 (U. S. 1944).
9. 65 S.Ct. 103, 107.
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he would eat the lamb anyhow. However badly the treasury may
need meat it is the hope of the writer that the bona fide property
distinctions of the states will continue to be recognized as they
are in the majority opinion of the, case under discussion and that
more tax money, if needed, will be raised by other methods than
by overruling a line of decisions which were considered in the
light of the community property system as such and not as a
foregone conclusion which would bring more money into the
treasury.
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-COST OF ADMINISTRATION-The surviv-
ing spouse of Vaccaro became, at his death, the full owner of one-
half of the community property. Vaccaro's estate was settled, but
there were considerable charges upon the estate: attorneys' fees,
executrix's commission, and other costs of administration. These
amounted to more than seventy-three thousand dollars. Plaintiff,
the surviving spouse, attempted to deduct these charges from her
husband's gross estate under Section 303, Revenue Act of 1926,
as amended. The commissioner refused, and allowed only the
deduction of one-half of the charges, asserting that one-half of
such expenses were incurred in the administration of the widow's
one-half of the community estate. Held, the entire amount is
deductible from the decedent's gross estate because, since the
community terminated at the death of the husband, it was no
longer capable of being charged with expenses and no part should
be charged to the half of the community owned by the surviving
spouse. Vaccaro v. United States, 4 Prentice-Hall 1944 Fed. Tax
Serv. 62,646, C.C.H. Fed. Estate and Inheritance Tax Serv.
10,129 (E.D. La. 1944).
This decision is based largely upon a ruling by Justice Odom
in Succession of Lewis1 to the effect that "all costs of the admin-
istration should be paid out of the estate of the deceased, and that
the community was not liable for any portion thereof."2 In sup-
port of his ruling, Justice Odom cites Succession of Solis' and
Succession of Pizatti.4 These cases, however, are authority only
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939).
2. 192 La. 734, 743, 189 So. 118, 121 (1939).
S. 10 La. App. 109, 119 So. 768 (1929).
4. 141 La. 645, 75 So. 498 (1917).
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